Efficient Multi-Party Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes by Xiao, Li et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
04
05
17
9v
1 
 2
8 
M
ay
 2
00
4
Efficient Multi-Party Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
Li Xiao1,2, Gui Lu Long1,2,3,4∗, Fu-Guo Deng1,2, Jian-Wei Pan5
1Department of Physics, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
2 Key Laboratory for Quantum Information and Measurements, MOE, Beijing 100084, P R China
3 Center of Atomic and Molecular NanoSciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
4 Center for Quantum Information, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
5 Institute for Experimental Physics University of Vienna, Boltzmanngasse 5, Vienna 9, Austria
(Dated: August 6, 2018)
In this work, we generalize the quantum secret sharing scheme of Hillary, Buzˇek and Berthi-
aume[Phys. Rev. A59, 1829(1999)] into arbitrary multi-parties. Explicit expressions for the shared
secret bit is given. It is shown that in the Hillery-Buzˇek-Berthiaume quantum secret sharing scheme
the secret information is shared in the parity of binary strings formed by the measured outcomes of
the participants. In addition, we have increased the efficiency of the quantum secret sharing scheme
by generalizing two techniques from quantum key distribution. The favored-measuring-basis Quan-
tum secret sharing scheme is developed from the Lo-Chau-Ardehali technique[H. K. Lo, H. F. Chau
and M. Ardehali, quant-ph/0011056] where all the participants choose their measuring-basis asym-
metrically, and the measuring-basis-encrypted Quantum secret sharing scheme is developed from
the Hwang-Koh-Han technique [W. Y. Hwang, I. G. Koh and Y. D. Han, Phys. Lett. A244, 489
(1998)] where all participants choose their measuring-basis according to a control key. Both schemes
are asymptotically 100% in efficiency, hence nearly all the GHZ-states in a quantum secret sharing
process are used to generate shared secret information.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
The combination of quantum mechanics with information has produced many interesting and important develop-
ments. Quantum cryptography is one important application. Quantum key distribution(QKD) concerns the distri-
bution of one-time-pad keys between distant two parties[1]. With quantum mechanics, other cryptographic task can
be realized. Suppose Alice wants two parties Bob and Charlie who are at distant places to fulfil certain task. Alice
knows that one of them may be dishonest, but she does not know who this dishonest guy is. To complete this task,
classical cryptography uses the secret sharing technique[2, 3]. In quantum information, this task can be achieved by
quantum secret sharing(QSS), and it is a fruitful area of research. Many researches have been carried out[4, 5, 7, 8, 9].
It has also been demonstrated in experiment recently[6]. With quantum mechanics, one can share both classical
information and quantum information. In this paper, we consider the issue of sharing of classical secret information.
We specifically consider the QSS scheme proposed by Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume(Hereafter we refer to HBB
protocol) [4]. In Ref.[4], secret sharing with 3 and 4 parties have been studied. In the HBB QSS scheme, the secret
sharing is accomplished by using GHZ-state[10]. In this scheme, Alice, Bob and Charlie need to choose randomly one
measuring-basis from either the σx-measuring-basis or the σy-measuring-basis respectively, similar to the BB84 QKD
scheme[1]. In half of the cases, nobody chooses the σy-axis or two parties choose the σy-axis, the measuring results of
the three parties are correlated. In these cases, Bob and Charlie can combine their measuring-basis information and
their measurement outcomes to determine the results of Alice’s measurement. In this case, Alice’s measurement result
is used as the secret information that she wants Bob and Charlie to share. Generally in order to establish the secret
sharing scheme, a detailed table needs to be constructed to list all the possible combinations of the measuring-basis
and the possible outcomes of all parties. When the number of participating parties is large, the construction of such
a table is very tedious and it is also inconvenient to use. In this paper, we reformulate the HBB scheme in simple
mathematical terms, and the shared secret information becomes the parity of a binary string formed by the measured
outcomes of the participating parties. From this formulation, the rules in the HBB QSS scheme are obtained. For
instance for a round of communication to be a valid one, the number of parties choosing the σy-basis has to be even,
because when even number of parties choose the σy basis, the bit value of Alice has a one-to-one correspondence
with the parity of the binary number formed by the measurement outcomes of the participating parties. From this
mathematical formalism, we generalize the HBB scheme into arbitrary number parties cases. This is given in section
II.
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2In the HBB QSS scheme, only half of the GHZ-states can be used for secret sharing. This is the intrinsic limitation
of this scheme. This is similar to the BB84 QKD scheme where only half of the photons transmitted can be used
to generate useful keys. In QKD, Lo, Chau and Ardehali [11] have proposed a scheme that increases the intrinsic
efficiency to 100% asymptotically. In their scheme, they choose one preferred measuring-basis most of the time, and
choose the other measuring-basis, the unfavored measuring-basis, with a small probability. The events that Alice and
Bob choose the unfavored measuring-basis are used later for eavesdropping checking. This has greatly increased the
intrinsic efficiency of the BB84 scheme. In the limiting case of large numbers, the efficiency approaches 100%. This
has been shown to be unconditionally secure[11]. Hwang, Koh and Han[12] have proposed another modification to
the BB84 QKD scheme that also increases its efficiency to nearly 100% by letting Alice and Bob to choose identical
measuring-basis according to a common secret key. This control key is used repeatedly during a QKD transmission
session. Controlled keys have also been used in QKD in the controlled-order-rearrangement-encryption scheme[13],
where Alice takes one particles from each Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR) pair from a group of EPR pairs and mixes up
their orders and sends them to Bob, and Bob recovers the orders of the particles to get the correct particle correlation
of EPR pairs. Alice and Bob synchronize their action by using a control key repeatedly. The following example
explains the Koh and Han technique: if the control key is 0101001110, then Alice and Bob choose their measuring-
basis in the following sequence ”+×+×++×××+” where ”+” represents the vertical-horizontal measuring basis,
and ”×” represents the diagonal-antidiagonal measuring-basis. The control key is usually quite short, say 1000 bits
long. It is repeated again and again until the QKD process ends. In this way, Alice and Bob can always choose the
same measuring-basis. The quantum mechanical nature of the single photons renders eavesdropping detectable, and
the random nature of the measured results keeps the information on the control key safe. It has been shown that the
scheme is secure[14] for ideal single photon sources. The essential ingredient in these improvements is to allow the
two parties to use identical measuring-basis as much as possible Generalizing these two techniques, we have proposed
two efficient QSS schemes that is asymptotically 100% in efficiency. This is given in section III. A summary is given
in section IV.
II. MULTI-PARTY HBB QUANTUM SECRET SHARING SCHEME
We present the n-party HBB QSS scheme first. Suppose there are n-parties taking part in the secret sharing process.
It is done by using a sequence of GHZ-multiplets
|ψ〉GHZ = 1√
2
(|000..0〉+ |111...1〉), (1)
where state |0〉 = |z+〉 and |1〉 = |z−〉 are eigen-states of the spin-projection in the z-direction, σz . Alice keeps one
particle and sends the other two particles to Bob and Charlie each. Then Alice, Bob, Charlie randomly choose from
the σx and the σy basis to measure their particles respetively. The eigen-states of the σx and the σy operators are
|0〉x = |+ x〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉), |1〉x = | − x〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (2)
|0〉y = |+ y〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ i|1〉), |1〉y = | − y〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉). (3)
Inversely we have the expansion of the eigen-states of the σz operator in terms of the σx and the σy eigen-basis as
follows
|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉x + |1〉x), |1〉 = 1√2 (|0〉x − |1〉x), (4)
|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉y + |1〉y), |1〉 = − i√2 (|0〉y − |1〉y). (5)
We make the convention that the positive polarized states along x- or y-axis, are taken as 0, and those along the
negative direction are denoted as 1. In the HBB scheme, only half of the GHZ particles can be used for secret sharing.
The choice of the measuring basis plays an important role in judging whether a round of measurement can be used
for secret sharing.
We use a sequence [b1(j), b2(j), ..., bi(j), ..., bn(j)] to denote the measuring basis information for Alice, Bob ..., for the
j-th GHZ-state. The number in the bracket, j, refers to the j-th GHZ-state in a sequence of secret sharing operations.
The subscript refers to the order number of particles, 1 represents Alice’s particle, 2 refers to Bob’s particle and so
on. If bi(j) = 0, then the i-th party uses the x-basis, and bi(j) = 1 means that the i−th party uses the y-axis. To
3obtain the measuring result in such a case, we need to expand the GHZ-state in the eigen-basis of [bi(j), i = 1, ..., n].
Using equations (4) and (5), the |00 · · · 0〉 component can be written as
|00 · · · 0〉 =
n∏
i=1
(√
1
2
(|0〉bi + |1〉bi)
)
, (6)
and |11 · · · 1〉 component can be written as
|11 · · ·1〉 =
n∏
i=1
(−i√
2
(|0〉bi − |1〉bi)
)
. (7)
When the y-basis are chosen by an odd number of participants, the expansion for |11 · · · 1〉 has the following form
|11 · · · 1〉 = ± i
(
√
2)n
n∏
i=1
((|0〉bi − |1〉bi)) , (8)
where +-sign is for n = 2k + 1 and −-sign is for n = 4k + 1 where k is a positive integer.
Hence the GHZ-state in (1) can be rewritten as
|ψ〉GHZ = 1
2(n+1)/2
(
n∏
i=1
(|0〉bi + |1〉bi)± i
n∏
i=1
(|0〉bi − |1〉bi)
)
, (9)
for odd number of participants choosing the y-basis. There is no cancellation between the 1st product term and the
second product term in Eq.(9), and terms such as |0i2i3 · · · in−1〉b1b2···bn and |1i2i3 · · · in−1〉b1b2···bn both present in the
expansion in (9). In other words, for a set of measured values i2, · · ·, in measured in measuring-basis b2, · · ·, bn by
the participants Bob, Charlie and so on, Alice’s measured result still has two possibilities. Even if the n − 1 secret
sharing parties get together and disclose their measuring-basis information and their measuring outcomes, they still
can not obtain the result of Alice’s measurement. For instance in a 3-party QSS, if Alice chooses the y-axis, Bob and
Charlie choose the x-axis, the expansion in the eigen-basis of σy , σx and σx (for Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively)
will be
(1− i)
4
(|000〉+ |011〉+ |101〉+ |110〉) + (1 + i)
4
(|001〉+ |010〉+ |100〉+ |111〉) (10)
where the basis-orders y−x−x in the subscript are omitted for brevity. When Bob and Charlie have definite measured
results, Alice’s result still has two possibilities. For instance, when Bob and Charlie’s results are 0 and 0 respectively
( along the positive-x axis), Alice’s result may be 0 (along the positive-y axis) from component |000〉, or 1 (along the
negative-y axis) from component |100〉. Thus it is not useful for quantum secret sharing.
When the number of parties choosing the y-basis is even, we have
|ψ〉GHZ = 1
2(n+1)/2
(
n∏
i=1
(|0〉bi + |1〉bi)±
n∏
i=1
(|0〉bi − |1〉bi)
)
. (11)
Because some terms in the second product term in the expansion have negative sign, they cancel with relevant terms
in the first product term, hence there are only 2n−1 terms left in Eq.(11). Among the 2n−1 terms, the value of the first
bit, which is the result of Alice’s measurement, is uniquely determined by the remaining n− 1 bit values. In this case
when the n− 1 parties get together and reveal their measuring-basis information and the measured results, they can
uniquely determine the bit value of Alice. Unless all n− 1 participating parties present, the determination of Alice’s
bit value is impossible. For instance, if only n−2 parties are present, from their measured values and measuring-basis
information, they can only narrow the state down to two possibilities in which Alice can have either 0 or 1. Thus it
is only when all n− 1 parties work collectively that they can get the bit value of Alice.
Summarizing the above observation, the general rule for multi-party secret sharing are:
1) The number of parties using the σy-basis has to be even;
2) When the number of parties using y-basis is equal to 2(2k + 1) where k is a nonnegative integer, the bit value
of Alice is simply the modulo 2 sums of the n− 1 parties’ bit value plus 1:
iAlice = i1 = i2 ⊕ i3 ⊕ · · · ⊕ in ⊕ 1. (12)
4For instance in a 3-party QSS with two parties using y axis, there is a component |100〉 in the expansion (11) , the
modulo 2 sum of Bob and Charlie gives 0, then adding 1 gives 1;
3)When the number of parties taking the y-basis is 4k, then the bit value of Alice is simply the modulo 2 sum of
the n− 1 parties’ bit values.
iAlice = i1 = i2 ⊕ i3 ⊕ · · · ⊕ in. (13)
Hence the n-party HBB QSS scheme can be given as follows: (1) Alice prepares an n-particle GHZ-state (1). (2)
Alice keeps one particle at her own hand and sends the rest of particles to the n−1 participants, each party a particle;
(3) Each party chooses randomly from the x or the y measuring-basis to measure his/her particle. He/she keeps the
measured result and the measuring-basis information for his/her particle. If the measured result is up(down) along the
measuring-basis, records the result as 0(1); (4) the above procedures (1)-(3) are repeated many times until sufficient
number of measured results are produced. This should be at least twice as much as the number of desired shared bits;
(5) after procedure (4), each participants sends the measuring-basis information to Alice through a classical channel
and upon receiving all the measuring-basis information, Alice counts the number of parties choosing the y-basis. Alice
publicly announces the nature of this number for each round: odd, or an even number with the form of 2(2k+ 1), or
an even number with the form of 4k. The exact number of k needs not be disclosed. If the number is odd, then that
round of measurement result is dropped, and if the number is even, all the participants keep their measured values
and the measuring-basis information for these events. (6) Alice selects a sufficiently large subsets of events and asks
the participants to disclose their measured values for these events. From this information, Alice can check if there
exists eavesdropping in the quantum channel. For instance, if an eavesdropper tries to intercept the QSS scheme by
measuring the state of the particle intended for a legitimate participant using randomly the x or the y basis, the
error rate will be as high as 25%, just like the BB84 QKD case. If the error rate is high, then Alice concludes that
there is eavesdropping and the QSS session is dropped. If the error rate is low, then the QSS session is concluded
safe and after quantum error correction and privacy amplification, a final secret sharing bit string is produced. The
n − 1 participants can determine the shared secret bit using the QSS rules given in Eqns. (12,13) for each valid of
transmission.
We have reformulated the HBB QSS protocol in a concise mathematical form and generalized it into arbitrary
multi-parties. In these rules, the secret key can be simply calculated using the parity of the measurement outcomes of
the participating parties together with the number of y-basis used in the process. However only half of the GHZ-states
can be used for quantum secret sharing.
III. ASYMPTOTIC 100% EFFICIENT QSS SCHEMES
By 100% efficient, we mean that all the GHZ-state particles used in a QSS scheme can be used for sharing the
secret information as compared with the original HBB-QSS scheme where half of the GHZ-states have to be discarded,
because half of the time the participants may choose an odd number of σy-basis. Here we propose two efficient QSS
schemes using techniques that were originally used for QKD to increase the efficiency. Full efficiency can be obtained
if the participants can always choose the right combination of measuring-basis so that there are always even number
of participants choosing the σy-measuring-basis. This can be achieved in two different ways. One is to use the
method proposed by Lo, Chau and Ardehali for QKD[11]. In this scheme the efficiency of the BB84 QKD scheme is
asymptotically 100%. The other one is the one based on the method proposed by Hwang, Koh and Han[12]. They
have discovered that the efficiency of BB84 QKD scheme can be increased to 100% by letting Alice and Bob to choose
identical measuring-basis according to a common secret key repeatedly, say with a 1000 bit control key. For instance
a 0 in the control key means Alice and Bob use the horizontal/vertical measuring basis and a 1 in the control key
directs them to use the diagonal-antidiagonal measuring basis. These schemes have several advantages. First the
efficiency is increased to 100% asymptotically. Secondly the public announcement of measuring-basis can be omitted
or almost omitted and this saves a lot of storage space, classical communication and the comparison computation
time. These techniques can be generalized with some modification for use in QSS. In the following, we present the
results in details.
A. The Favored-Measuring-Basis Efficient QSS scheme
We call the efficient QSS scheme based on the Lo-Chau-Ardehali technique as the favored-measuring-basis efficient
QSS scheme. It is noticed that if all the participants in a QSS round choose the σx-basis, it is a valid QSS round,
5and the GHZ-state in (1) can be written in the σx-basis as
|ψ〉GHZ =
√
1
2n+1
(
n∏
i=1
(|0〉+ |1〉)−
n∏
i=1
(|0〉 − |1〉)
)
=
√
1
2n−1
′∑
i1i2···in
|i1 i2 · · · in〉, (14)
where the prime over the sum means a restricted sum for those running indices satisfying
i1 ⊕ i2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ in = 0. (15)
Terms like |10 · · · 0〉 are absent from the GHZ-state expression because a part from the second product cancels with
that from the first product term in Eq. (14). Hence a high-efficiency QSS scheme based on the Lo-Chau-Ardehali
technique[11] can be designed as follows: 1)Alice prepares a sequence of n-particle GHZ-state in state (1); 2) For
each GHZ-state, Alice keeps one particle at her own site and sends the rest n − 1 particles to other participants,
each particle to a participant; 3) Each participant chooses with a large probability to measure his/her particle in the
σx-basis, and with a small probability to measure in the σy-basis. They records the basis they use and the outcome
of the measurement for each particle; 4) After a large number of GHZ-state particles have been distributed and
measured, they publish their measuring basis for each GHZ-state; 5) For those rounds of communication where at
least one of the participants chooses the σy-basis, all the participants publish also the outcomes of their measurements.
In approximate half of these events, an even number of participants choose the σy-basis, and the outcomes of the
measurements of all the participants are correlated, and they will be used to check eavesdropping. We can modify
the refined data analysis method proposed in Ref.[11] to catch Eve. In the refined data analysis, one only checks
those cases that an even number of participants choose the σy-basis(excluding the case when no participants choose
the σy-basis). Eve’s interception will cause significant errors. Eve needs to intercept all the n − 1 particles sent
by Alice to the other n − 1 participants. Suppose Eve always uses the σx-basis to intercept, for those events that
two participants choose the σy-basis, Eve will introduce an error rate as high as 50%. If we just look at the events
where two participants choose the σy-basis, this case can be seen as an variant of the efficient QKD scheme between
these two participants where they use the σx-basis most of the time and the σy-basis only a small number of times
in Ref.[11]. By examining the error rate, the participants can determine whether the QSS communication is secure.
For noiseless channels and ideal photon sources, if no errors exist one can conclude the QSS operations safe. If there
are errors then one concludes that the QSS operations are insecure and discards the result. For noisy channels and
imperfect photon sources, one has to use quantum error correction and privacy amplification method to get secure
shared secret information. A more rigorous security analysis for this scheme, and the details of the post-processing is
needed, and this work in under way. We will not touch this issue in this paper.
B. The Measuring-Basis-Encrypted Efficient QSS scheme
We call the efficient QSS scheme based on the Hwang-Koh-Han QKD technique as the measuring-basis-encrypted
QSS scheme, because the measuring-basis of the participants are controlled by a secret key and this information
is encrypted. In the Hwang-Koh-Han QKD scheme, the measuring basis of Alice and Bob in a QKD process is
synchronized by a control key. Different from QKD where Alice and Bob use the same secret key to synchronize
their measuring-basis, we need n-control keys to control the valid choices of measuring-basis for the n participants.
Furthermore, the control key sequence is different for different participant. In table I, we give an example of control
keys for a three party QSS scheme. Here only the first 10 bits of the control keys are shown. In practice, the control
keys are about 1000 bits long.
The essential part is to generate a control key for each participant so that the set of measuring-basis in a QSS
transmission always has an even number of σy-basis. Now we introduce a method for establishing the control key
sequences for each party on-site using the original HBB QSS scheme. First we run the HBB QSS scheme in its original
form, that is, all parties choose their measuring-basis randomly. They record their results and also the measuring-
basis information. They then send the measuring-basis information to Alice, but the measured results are kept secret.
Upon receiving the measuring-basis information from all parties, Alice can decide which GHZ-multiplets are valid QSS
operation, that is, she knows that in these operations there are an even number of parties having chosen the σy-basis.
She then tell all the n− 1 parties to retain the results in these rounds. Then each of the party will have a sequence
of random numbers which is known only to himself/herself. It is noted that each party’s control key is different from
others. These numbers are used to determine each party’s measuring-basis choice. Except Alice, each party will use
6the σx(σy)-basis, if the bit value in her/his sequence is a 0(1). Alice’s control sequence is slightly different from the
others in the following way: if the number of σy-basis in the measurement is 4k, she simply choose σx(σy)-basis if her
measured result is a 0(1), and if the number of σy-basis measurement is 2(2k + 1), then she will choose σy(σx)-basis
if her measured result is a 0(1). This is because when the number of σy-basis is 4k, the measured result’s parity is
even, and it is odd when it is 2(2k + 1). As in the QKD case, this control key can be used repeatedly. The control
sequence needs not be long, a few hundreds of bit, the order of a thousand is sufficient.
The on-site generation of the control keys can be spared if the participating parties keep part of the random numbers
left over from a previous QSS operation.
The security of the QSS has been discussed in Ref.[4], and the discussion there also applies here. The security of
the repeated use of a control sequence is discussed in Ref.[12, 14], and they can be adapted here with some minor
modification. The QSS scheme can be viewed as a two ’party’ quantum key distribution scheme if one views the n− 1
parties as whole as a single participant. These n − 1 participants as a whole share a common secret key with Alice.
However inside these n−1 parties, they have to act collectively to work out the secret key of Alice. Any eavesdropping
will cause significant errors to the random key. Similarly, if one of the party is dishonest, significant error will occur.
For instance if Eve uses randomly the σx-basis and the σy-basis to measure n − 1 particles Alice sends to the n− 1
participants, then Eve will have (1/2)n−1 probability to choose the right measuring-basis. For those that Eve has
chosen the wrong measuring-basis, there is 50% of probability to make error in the parity of the string, which is the
shared secret information. Hence the error rate introduced by Eve is
e =
(
1− (1/2)n−1) 1/2. (16)
For n = 3, this amounts to 3/8=37.5%. As the number of participants increase, the error rate approaches 50%.
IV. SUMMARY
We have generalized the HBB QSS scheme into arbitrary number of parties, and given explicit expressions for the
shared secret information in terms of the parity of strings formed by the measured results of the n−1 participants. By
generalizing the Lo-Chau-Ardehali QKD scheme[11] and the Hwang-Koh-Han QKD scheme[12], we have developed
two efficient QSS schemes: the favored-measuring-basis scheme and the measuring-basis-encrypted QSS schemes. The
efficiency of these QSS schemes are asymptotically 100%. We have also qualitatively showed the security of the QSS
scheme. It remains to be shown the security of these QSS schemes in noisy channels and with imperfect single photon
sources, in a way similar to what have been done for the security of QKD[15, 16, 17]. Work is under way and the
result will be published elsewhere.
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